## RF36: Potential modifications to the red snapper IFQ program

	Items in Scoping	Consequences for conservation/management	Develop in
	Document	Questions for Committee	<b>Options paper?</b>
Program Eligibility	Restrict future transfer of shares to only shareholder accounts that hold a valid commercial reef fish permit.	<ul> <li>Would limit participation, including by entities who intend to only buy and sell allocation.</li> <li>Limiting participation would support goal to reduce overcapacity.</li> <li>May not be perceived as a problem needing attention anymore.</li> </ul>	
	Allow accounts with shares but without a commercial reef fish permit to harvest the allocation associated with those shares.	<ul> <li>Vessels would have to follow IFQ program landings requirements, including hail-ins and offloading at approved sites.</li> <li>Is a form of inter-sector trading.</li> </ul>	
	Limit the amount of shares/allocation non-permitted IFQ accounts may possess.	Would limit participation, including by entities who intend to only buy and sell allocation.	

	Items in Scoping Document	Consequences for conservation/management  Questions for Committee	Options paper?
ion	Eliminate the commercial red snapper minimum size limit.	<ul> <li>Could reduce/eliminate regulatory discards.</li> <li>May not be possible given limited quantity of IFQ allocation.</li> </ul>	
Full retention	Consider the full retention of commercially caught red snapper.	<ul> <li>Could reduce/eliminate regulatory discards.</li> <li>May not be possible given limited quantity of IFQ allocation.</li> </ul>	

	Items in Scoping Document	Consequences for conservation/management  Questions for Committee	Options paper?
IFQ Allocation Caps	Establish a cap on the amount of RS-IFQ allocation that may be held by an entity.	What is the Committee trying to achieve with a cap? What practice or behavior is to be addressed?	
	Establish a cap on the amount of RS-IFQ allocation that can be landed by a single vessel.	<ul> <li>Landings of red snapper by vessel are similar to vessel landings before IFQ program implementation.</li> <li>Would disproportionally affect entities with a single vessel more than accounts associated with multiple vessels.</li> <li>What is the Committee trying to achieve with a cap? What practice or behavior is to be addressed?</li> </ul>	

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vated	For accounts that have never been activated in the current system, close accounts and redistribute shares: i) if the accounts are not active by a specified date.	Would improve sector's ability to achieve OY.	
er been act	ii) to those with no or small shares or to new entrants to reduce regulatory discards.	<ul> <li>There is not much quota remaining in these accounts (&lt;1%); is this a problem needing attention?</li> </ul>	
Accounts that have never been activated	iii) to address reduction of regulatory discards through quota banks or NMFS administration (particularly for eastern Gulf shareholders and vessels).	<ul> <li>There is not much quota remaining in these accounts (&lt;1%); is this a problem needing attention?</li> <li>Quota banks are already being developed among shareholders.</li> </ul>	
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	In the event of future increases to the commercial red snapper quota, consider alternatives to redistribute the quota increases to new entrants and small shareholders.		

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Enforcement	Require all vessels with a commercial reef fish permit to hail-in prior to landing, even if they are not in possession of IFQ species.	Would improve enforcement of all commercial reef fish landings, including IFQ species.	

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Requirements for use of shares/allocation	Establish use-it or lose-it provisions.	<ul> <li>What is the Committee trying to achieve? What practice or behavior is to be addressed?</li> </ul>	
	Restrict ability for shareholders not actively engaged in fishing to transfer their shares and allocation to other shareholders.	<ul> <li>IFQ system does not track the transfers of individual pounds of allocation, which may be transferred multiple times, and entities often separate assets into multiple accounts.</li> <li>How would "actively engaged in fishing" be defined, e.g., for shares held by corporations?</li> </ul>	
	Place restrictions on the transfer of IFQ allocations and shares.	<ul> <li>What is the Committee trying to achieve with restrictions? What practice or behavior is to be restricted?</li> <li>What type of restrictions should be made?</li> </ul>	
ements f	Adopt a roll-over provision for unused IFQ allocation.	<ul> <li>May be problematic for monitoring annual sector ACL; quota will be decreasing over next 3 years.</li> </ul>	
Require	Consider adopting a lease-to-own provision, such that an entity buying ("leasing") allocation earns some credit toward possession of IFQ shares.	<ul> <li>Would shift possession of shares toward those who land red snapper allocation.</li> <li>May result in unintended consequences as shareholders are less likely to sell allocation ("lease") if they would be required to surrender the shares.</li> <li>Difficult to track transfers of allocation to determine original shareholder when allocation is landed.</li> </ul>	

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Quota change	Withhold distribution of some portion of a shareholder's allocation at the beginning of the year if a mid-year quota reduction is expected.	<ul> <li>Since inclusion in the scoping document, this action is under development in a Framework Action which would apply to the 2016 season, only. The action could be made permanent in this amendment.</li> <li>As an action, could evaluate applicability to all IFQ species.</li> </ul>	